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For some time now I have been thinking about a series of legal 
events that provoke a challenge to the generally positive norm of flexi-
bility. Flexibility of thought is a good thing, we believe. However, these 
events, all of which in one way or another have been thought of as 
“emergencies” make us revalue negatively our predilection to be open-
minded and, conversely, situate more affirmatively words like “intran-
sigent,” “rigid,” “intractable.” These harsher versions of the more polite 
word “steadfast” cause us, as I wish to do throughout this Article, to 
challenge our liberal predilections, our blue-state and John Stuart Mill–
ian allegiance to tolerance, tolerance especially for the positions we 
detest. I am no red-stater myself, but my own work (including as a liti-
gator) about the way lawyers behaved during the World War II French 
regime called Vichy and my subsequent interest in liberal academic 
equivocation about the post-9/11 practice of torture, have led me to 
think in a broader way about flexibility, and especially, that sub-
category called hermeneutic or interpretive flexibility. 
The baseline enlightenment position is, of course, that of flexibil-
ity. There are many upsides to heeding constant challenges to our views, 
especially as coupled with a programmatic willingness to veer toward 
views diametrically opposed to our own. They are set out brilliantly but 
not with complete convincingness in a tradition epitomized by the se-
cond chapter of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). I am not the first 
to ask us to consider the downside of constant openness.1 I emphasize 
three inter-related strengths of the seemingly naughty words inflexibil-
ity and intractability: First, denying normatively the merits of flexibility 
removes the easy out of attacking opposed positions just because they 
are inflexible. We are compelled to skip over the self-congratulatory 
comparison of our liberal open-ness to their fundamentalist intransi-
gence. Flowing from this and second, we enter more quickly into the 
domain of substantive judgment of contrasting positions. Judgments 
emerge directly from the perceived rightness or wrongness of the op-
posed, inflexible position. Flexiphobia not only entails but also facili-
tates making such judgments. The very judgmental closure that we en-
lightened ones normatively avoid permits us to reflect on the 
substantive, as opposed to the methodological defects both in our own 
 
 1 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Argument from Truth, in FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ENQUIRY (1982). Kent Greenawalt allows for what I am calling a flexiphobic response to the 
views we abhor: “Even if the state should tolerate expressions of racial bigotry, individuals may 
be warranted in greeting bigots with disapproval and minimizing contacts with them.” KENT 
GREENWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 30 (1987). Much of this Article has to do with 
choices that we make as Greenawalt’s “individuals.” 
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and in others’ positions. Third, and of greatest importance to this Arti-
cle, a normative privileging of intransigent positions assists us—in 
times of crisis especially—to safeguard positions we hold dear but 
which—as in Vichy or the recent post 9/11 American debate on “tor-
ture”2—have been rendered equivocal by flexible analyses. 
As with the Vichy project itself, which led to an empirical study of 
French legal reasoning during World War II,3 my inspiration for flex-
iphobia as I now call it came from powerful fictional stories. Just as my 
curiosity about World War II France was provoked by Camus’ The 
Stranger and The Fall,4 so a counter-flow I saw in Faulkner’s Intruder 
in the Dust stimulated my first allegiance to intractability. For it is that 
word, used seven times (and “inflexible” used thrice) by the narrator 
about the wrongly accused Lucas Beauchamp, a man of color about to 
be lynched in Faulkner’s imaginary Yoknopotawpha County, that creat-
ed over the course of the narrative one key lesson: to stick to the good 
when the world is falling apart, you need to be inflexible. Furthermore, 
just as I teach all three of those stories every year in my “Law and Lit-
erature” class, so I developed a classroom exercise connected to my 
work on Vichy, and it is here that I am going to exemplify in some de-
tail for this Article how the risks of flexibility have unfolded when 
American lawyers or law students are tasked with role- playing as war-
time lawyers. I then move on to a brief appraisal of flexibility versus 
flexiphobia within otherwise allied camps, my example being the Drey-
fus Affair in France, with a very brief footnoted account of how the 
legal team that successfully helped Holocaust survivors in U.S. federal 
court eventually broke apart and an even quicker but up to the moment 
glimpse of the debate among American lawyers on executive branch 
targeting of U.S. citizens. In notes 32 and 33, I introduce a wider pro-
ject’s taking up of the theological implications of flexiphobia. 
 
I.     FLEXIPHOBIA ENTAILS CHOICE, BUT DISCRETION IS CONSTRAINED BY 
LONG HABITS OF MIND AND PRACTICE 
A.     Elaine Scarry and the Importance of Habit 
 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish flexiphobia from an an-
tipathy to choice. To the contrary, the impulse toward intractability 
means the actor understands that there are choices, that he or she in fact 
has a form of discretion available at all times. The question then be-
 
 2 Richard Weisberg, Loose Professionalism, or Why Lawyers Take the Lead on Torture, in 
TORTURE: A COLLECTION 299–307 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
 3 RICHARD WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1st ed. 1996). 
 4 Id. at 7. 
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comes which choice to make, typically as between a new variable and 
an old, ensconced principle of thought and action. 
In a recent small masterpiece, Thinking in an Emergency, Elaine 
Scarry describes in great detail patterns of thought that permit people 
trained in crisis management to respond with habituated actions and 
words that assist others to survive emergencies. One such training is 
CPR, a life-saving technique that requires the practitioner to repeat 
(sometimes for as long as thirty minutes and often knowing that a hu-
man life is in her hands) long practiced, intractable patterns of behavior. 
As Scarry, who has been part of a fledgling project with Peter Brooks 
and myself connected to my theme today,5 puts it,  
The procedures for CPR confirm a feature of habit that is often cited 
in critiques of habit, its rigidity, while at the same time vividly illus-
trating a mistake those critiques make when they attribute to rigidity 
a robotic (or automaton-like) lack of thought. . . . The procedures are 
so well internalized that mental space is left over for addressing addi-
tional complicating patterns.6 
Ensconced habits of mind arise, rather than disappear, during mo-
ments of professional stress or even long periods of perceived “emer-
gency.” One habit might be to forget all prior training and shift ground 
completely, once so challenged. But the more effective actors, like the 
first responders in Scarry’s study, call upon long standing traditions of 
thought and action. As Scarry puts it about another set of life-saving 
habits she studied, those of mutual aid contracts across communities in 
Canada and Japan, “the question is not whether habit will surface in an 
emergency (it surely will) but instead which habit will emerge, and 
whether it will be serviceable or unserviceable.”7 
 
B.     The Guernsey Exercise 
 
An exercise I devised based on an actual situation in the occupied 
British channel island of Guernsey asks what kinds of habits might help 
lawyers to retain ingrained habits of thinking that are as meritorious as 
those of the CPR practitioners, without losing the capacity to think with 
sufficient creativity at the margins of those habits and without losing 
those excellent habits of thought altogether due to a real or perceived 
emergency. The outcome of almost twenty years of assigning the 
 
 5 See Karen Donovan, Princeton Conference Asks: Do We Need a “Slow Law” Movement?, 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/
MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=ContentEdit&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10572&contentid
=17176&folderid=540. 
 6 ELAINE SCARRY, THINKING IN AN EMERGENCY 20 (2011). 
 7 Id. at 43. 
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Guernsey exercise to lawyers is that, overwhelmingly, they compromise 
their finest traditional patterns of thought.8 Flexibility has become en-
grained as a norm, and the training these lawyers have received in high-
level generalizations about equality, fairness, due process, tends to dis-
appear. The results faithfully parallel the historical disaster wrought by 
otherwise fine and equality-trained lawyers, judges, and academicians 
during Vichy and also our own recent experience with incursions on 
foundational, pre-9/11 habits of thought shared by American lawyers 
about torture or wiretapping or special prisons. 
The “Guernsey Scenario,” a dramatization recently offered at the 
New York City Bar Association Inns of Court,9 and the exercise itself 
are appended. I found the actual file in the French archives in the course 
of researching Vichy. The obvious chance it gave me was to present 
English-language wartime documents that mirrored a central problem of 
French law during World War II: defining the Jew for purposes of even-
tual isolation, expropriation, and imprisonment. The file concerns an 
innkeeper, Mrs. V.B. Woolnaugh, who is at risk under the French-
modeled Guernsey orders of being defined as a Jew. She falls into the 
category of “mixed heritage individuals”—those whose grandparental 
heritage made of them the ambiguous case lawyers love so much. Under 
French law, more or less imported into the nearby channel islands such 
as Guernsey, and to some extent like the Nazi Nuremberg laws of 1935, 
the individual with exactly two Jewish and two non-Jewish grandpar-
ents fell into a gray area.10 Mrs. Woolnaugh was apparently just such a 
person. Under the gun of Guernsey law, as interpreted by British-trained 
lawyers and bureaucrats, she might now lose her inn and her life de-
pending on the interpretive strategies adopted by the Guernsey lawyer 
my audiences are now asked to become for purposes of the exercise. 
 
 8 For then-preliminary findings that have been borne out in many subsequent experiments, 
see Richard Weisberg, The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of the Grotesque, with 
a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875 (1996). A graph at the end of the 
article indicates that about eighty percent of those taking the exercise avoid altogether their legal 
training in higher level arguments available to them and instead embrace the exercise on low 
levels that seem to them appropriate for the “new” material. This tracks empirically the response 
of French lawyers and judges during World War II to the anti-Jewish laws promulgated by the 
Vichy regime. For the exercise itself, see infra app. A (“WRITING ASSIGNMENT”). 
 9 See the “Guernsey Scenario,” infra app. B. That screenplay was delivered before eighty or 
so lawyers at the Inns of Court in New York City on September 16, 2010. The lawyers then were 
divided into six groups of about thirteen each to discuss how to respond. Although their internal 
debate, which was monitored in each group, usually began with a range of options including 
formal rejection of the anti-Jewish laws on legal (not only moral) grounds connected to the law's 
violation of many foundational safeguards, the work product in the end tracked the usual statistic: 
eighty percent or so opted into foregrounding the lower level question: Is Mrs. Woolnaugh a Jew 
under the Order of April 26, 1941? All went through arguments on both sides, with most groups 
concluding she probably was not a Jew, and hence, could keep her inn. Id. 
 10 See WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 37–81. 
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How would American lawyers respond, from the safety of their 
classrooms or bar association events, to the dilemma apparently im-
posed on the Guernsey innkeeper by laws at least equally as inimical to 
Anglo-American professional habits as they were to their French con-
freres? Overwhelmingly, they set aside their trained patterns of tradi-
tional thought and responded on fatally attractive levels of generality. 
“The key issue,” as almost eighty percent conclude in one way or an-
other, “is whether Mrs. Woolnaugh is a Jew.” Gone in the face of the 
new situation is almost every trace of their higher level training. A small 
minority enter the issue with questions such as “Who has the burden of 
proof, and if it is the government, can ‘Jewishness’ by grandparental 
heritage be proven at all during wartime?” Or “Do these laws violate 
traditional constraints on ex post facto criminal sanctions?” or “Does 
not the Order violate principles of due process?” or, more pragmatical-
ly: “Before proceeding at all against Mrs. Woolnaugh or any other sus-
pected Jew, should we not interrogate that fellow Gill, who may have 
falsely accused her of marrying in a Jewish temple?” 
Lawyers exhibit under the stress of a troubling new professional 
challenge a deliberate tunnel vision, which makes them somehow feel 
better than if they were to apply fundamental and longer held patterns of 
thought. As Scarry observed, some habits always emerge in such situa-
tions; it is a question of which habits. So the very novelty of the factual 
context eventually trumps the trained intuition, here of a hypothetical 
Anglo-American trained lawyer. “Is she a Jew?,” despite the obvious 
grotesqueness of the question, replaces “Now that I have been put in 
charge, do I enforce such a law or do I work to make it a nullity or at the 
very least to minimize its effect not only on this targeted individual but 
on all such individuals who may not be able to make her protective ar-
guments convincingly?11 An engrained proclivity to see all sides of an 
issue and then to relish the potential creative arguments spring boarding 
from that complexity also kicks in. It might be called “compromise”12 
but it is better understood as a kind of professional excitement during 
which old habits of thought yield fairly quickly to new opportunities. 
 
 11 The problem with “incrementalism,” or working within the system to try to do a little good, 
is not only that the arguments for one individual may be unconvincing to supervising authorities, 
but much more so that for every one person protected, hundreds or thousands similarly situated 
who cannot make the winning argument are placed at greater risk because the basic structure has 
been accepted—this time by the role playing “Guernsey lawyer”. See Symposium, Nazis in the 
Courtroom: Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges Under the Law of the Third Reich 
and Vichy, France, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (1995); see also Robert Burt, Wrong Tomorrow, 
Wrong Yesterday, but Not Today: On Sliding into Evil with Zeal but Without Understanding, 5 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 19 (1999); Symposium, Lawyer Collaboration with Systems of Evil, 
5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 19 (1999). 
 12 See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821 (2011), 
and my response, Richard Weisberg, Levinson Is to Mr. Justice “Isaiah” As St. Paul Was to the 
Prophet Isaiah, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 925 (2011). 
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C.     A Flexiphobic Legal Response in Vichy 
 
In the real world of Hitler’s Europe, lawyers and judges over-
whelmingly accepted lawful anti-Semitism with a flexibility often nec-
essary to overcome their engrained habits of egalitarianism or due pro-
cess. The Vichy regime, jumping the gun on any Nazi pressure to do so, 
proudly and with a keen and articulated sense of autonomy promulgated 
and implemented almost 200 laws and regulations against Jews on war-
time French soil.13 Eventually, 75,000 people were sent “to the East” 
under color of Vichy law while 3000 more died in Vichy-administered 
camps like Gurs14 and Beaunes-la-Rolande.15 
Shortly after these strange laws’ appearance and whatever their 
original habituated response to them might have been—Vichy lawyers 
were calling their regime’s new laws “cette matière fort délicate et 
nouvelle,” this new and fragile material.16 As to a titillating young 
wine, they might now bring their interpretive skills and individual tastes 
to legalized anti-Semitism, previously so antipathetic to their profes-
sional experience. Vichy quickly placed at risk of severe legal sanction 
tens of thousands of full Jews (or those with three Jewish grandparents) 
and thousands more who, like Mrs. Woolnaugh, might be so defined 
despite thinking of themselves as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or athe-
ist. Four years of ink were spilled by French legal actors and analysts on 
the statutory definition of “Jew” and in particular the mixed heritage 
individual. The key factor, heuristically on exhibit in the Guernsey ex-
ercise, was the entry-level choice of issues raised by the analyzing legal 
authority. After some hesitation because the “new material” and its anti-
egalitarianism was so foreign to their tastes, French lawyers over-
whelmingly rejected high levels of generalization in favor of savoring 
the narrow issue: who is a Jew?17 
 
 13 See WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 37–81. 
 14 Id. at 342. 
 15 Id. at 244. 
 16 Id. at 68. 
 17 Camus’s novels aside, I was first drawn into a study of Vichy law while perusing French 
journals in the Columbia Law Library early in 1981. While for most other wartime countries, 
official law reports were missing, between 1940 and 1944, the French Gazette du Palais contin-
ued to publish. Everything in the reporters looked like pre-war and post-war doctrine and analysis 
except for the new category I found in the index for each year: “Juifs.” Both in the occupied and 
unoccupied zones, French draftsmen, and then French lawyers and judges, made much of a racial 
category that would have seemed bizarre to them before and was immediately expunged after. 
This process developed without much Nazi intervention; the Germans were delighted to import 
the expansive Vichy laws into the Occupied Zone, WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 46, and even had 
to slap Vichy’s wrists for attacking too many categories of potential victims left untouched by 
Nazi law. See WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 196–240. 
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However, flexiphobia manifested itself early, distinctly, and admi-
rably. 
In Vichy, one early responder relied on the engrained habits of 
mind later exemplified in Scarry’s work as a safeguard to overly malle-
able professional responses during emergencies: Professor Jacques 
Maury opined in the central law reporter, the Journal officiel, that no 
French lawyer or judge would accept the then brand new basic Vichy 
definitional laws at all.18 Almost before the regime’s ink was dry on the 
dreadful laws of October 3–4, 1940, Maury protested frontally against 
the very legitimacy of his own new government’s anti-Semitic statutes. 
Professor Maury might have feared reprisals for his protest not only 
from Vichy but also from the Nazis. He wrote in Occupied Paris, and he 
was taking on the first set of laws against the Jews, not by parsing them 
in detail but instead by tossing them as a whole into the garbage pail 
marked “not French.” The young law professor was positive his col-
leagues would see the same disconnect between these new laws and 
every pattern of French egalitarian thought to which they were profes-
sionally habituated. At the time, many French lawyers felt, but did not 
write, as Maury did: if the Germans insist on anti-Semitic policies, 
maybe they will succeed, but French law simply will not go down that 
path.19 Maury placed these traditional thoughts centrally before his col-
leagues: 
There is an increasing abandonment of our long-held rule safeguard-
ing equality in their rights as well as in their responsibilities to all 
French people. . . . [O]n the specific characteristic thus emphasized, 
the great majority of nationals are safeguarded rights that all the oth-
ers, unless excepted, definitively and even retroactively lose.20 
Maury’s protest went to the jugular: laws discriminating among 
French citizens and residents on the basis of racial and religious quali-
ties simply were not French; they violated long traditions of equality 
and would not be enforced, he believed, by French judges. If the Ger-
mans insisted (as they had not yet had time to do!) on persecuting Jews, 
well so be it; but the French would reach up to principles long held dear 
and would see their own regime’s acts as aberrational; as though in a 
CPR or community aid reflex, they would call upon their trained intui-
tions as French lawyers. 
Maury entered the debate with a high-level –of-generality attack on 
the laws, and he did so in the face of two authoritarian and potentially 
brutal regimes. He was not taken out and shot or even detained. Eventu-
 
 18 WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 54–55. 
 19 As the lawyer Philippe Serre, a renegade from the Vichy regime who had courageously 
voted in Parliament against granting Marshal Petain full powers, told me in 1982: “There would 
have been no racial policy in France if the French had refused.” Id. at 3. 
 20 Id. at 54–55 & n.60. 
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ally, seeing his colleagues abandon old habits fairly quickly, he began 
writing and testifying about Jews on lower levels of legal generality. He 
“got tenure.” 
The problem resided in those colleagues, not in the oppressive 
governments that his early flexiphobia directly challenged. 
 
II.     IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: HITLER CRAVES FLEXIBILITY 
A.     Positivism Was Rarely the Chief Offender 
 
The immediate postwar debate on whom to blame for Nazi legalis-
tic wrongdoing assumed that inflexibility was the villain. Not yet mind-
ful of the volumes of empirical data and academic discussion of Hitler’s 
courts that eventually emerged later in the twentieth century, the schol-
arship pitted—both in Germany and the U.S.—distinguished natural 
lawyers against equally distinguished positivists, who doubted the valid-
ity of any conflation of law and morality.21 It turns out that the positiv-
ists had no need to defend their seemingly rigid approach to law, be-
cause Nazi jurisprudence from the onset of the regime fought to create 
flexible judges. Carl Schmitt, whose controversial writings paved the 
way for the odd form of “legality” present in the Third Reich, declared 
that “the era of legal positivism has come to an end.”22 He recognized 
“the paralyzing effect” on a revolutionary movement such as National 
Socialism “of legal-positivist jurisprudence.”23 Nazi judges consistently 
ruled against Schmitt-ian “others,” i.e., enemies of the state such as 
Jews, even when there were no laws on the books to justify such rul-
ings.24 
Once a statute was promulgated, hermeneutic manipulation from 
the bench became even more obvious: An example is the parsing of the 
words “sexual intercourse,” after such activity between Jew and non-
Jew had been prohibited by the “Law for the Protection of German 
Blood and Honor” of September 15, 1935. Courts had to figure out 
whether defendants (usually the Jew in the situation) could be severely 
 
 21 See, e.g., INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 219–30 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991); see also Matthew Lippman, Law, Lawyers, and Legality 
in the Third Reich: the Perversion of Principle and Professionalism, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 199, 200–02 (1997). 
 22 MÜLLER, supra note 21, at 219; Lippman, supra note 21, at 219; see also MICHAEL STOL-
LEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON LEGAL HISTORY IN NAZI GERMANY (Thom-
as Dunlop trans., 1998). 
 23 GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936, at 90–94 (2d ed. 1989). 
 24 One example among scores is the tolerance for pre-statutory judicial dissolution of many 
marriages between Jews and non-Jews, MÜLLER, supra note 21, at 93; such dissolutions were 
“what the Fuehrer wanted,” after all. Id. 
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punished for such acts as mutual touching, flirting, or even becoming 
aroused by an Aryan woman. A panel of the High Criminal Court stated 
a new rule of habitual flexibility: “The courts to which the Third Reich 
has assigned responsibility for administering justice, can carry out this 
task . . . only if they do not remain glued to the letter of the law . . . .”25 
Postwar Nuremberg trial documentation sets out just as plainly the flex-
ible program: “[The] elastic nature of National Socialist legislation re-
quired the interpretative ability of an enlightened and energetic judici-
ary.”26 
 
B.     One Flexiphobic Nazi Judge Summons Up the Best Habits of Mind 
and Protests Euthanasia from the Bench 
 
Flexibility, however—which entails an open-ness to the new and 
the untested—is not the only cast of thought available to trained lawyers 
and judges. Even in the worst times, as we saw with the young French 
law professor Maury, flexiphobic responses can emerge, summoning 
the finest in professionally habituated behavior even as—or precisely 
when—all around are submitting to chaos. But was there an historical 
German analogue to Maury, who attempted to do CPR on France’s 
flagging legal life-stream? 
Yes. 
Ingo Mueller reports on the “one documented case of resistance in 
which a judge opposed the system in the course of carrying out his pro-
fessional duties.”27 Dr. Lothar Kreyssig, a committed Lutheran, was not 
a novice like Maury, and neither did his protest come early on. In fact, 
Judge Kreyssig had been on the Brandenburg Court of Guardianship 
since the waning Weimar years. Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 did not 
diminish his proclivity to “numerous minor acts of insubordination.”28 
In 1938, he had publicly protested the arrest of the prominent theologian 
Martin Niemoeller. But that and some relatively minor prior incidents of 
curmudgeonly behavior had not implicated his judicial function. All this 
changed in the early 1940s, when he began issuing injunctions to sever-
al hospitals to prevent them from pursuing the Nazi’s euthanasia poli-
cies; he followed this by bringing criminal charges against a Nazi party 
leader who had been identified as “responsible for the euthanasia pro-
gram.” Kreyssig—the habituated positivist? the deeply feeling member 
of the Lutheran Confessional Church?—wrote to the president of the 
Prussian Supreme Court: 
 
 25 See id. at 101. 
 26 Lippman, supra note 22, at 237–38. 
 27 MÜLLER, supra note 21, at 193. 
 28 Id. at 194. 
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“Whatever benefits the people is lawful;” in the name of this terrible 
doctrine, which has yet to be contradicted by those whom it be-
hooves to protect the law in Germany, entire areas of communal life 
have been placed beyond the reach of the law—the concentration 
camps, for example, and now institutions for the mentally ill as 
well.29 
Lothar Kreyssig, no more than Jacques Maury, suffered the immi-
nent execution we flexible ones might be all too eager to deduce from 
such behavior. Kreyssig did have to face the wrath of the fanatical Peo-
ple’s Court judge and Reich Ministry official Roland Freisler. But even 
that hysterically flexible figure sent him off with a slap on the wrist: in 
1942, Judge Kreyssig was retired from the bench at full pension. 
Maury and Kreyssig prove that stability, steadfastness, and intrac-
tability are habits equally available even and especially in times of 
emergency and complete collegial collapse and compromise. In Hitler’s 
Europe, this flexiphobic response was that of a tiny minority compared 
to the seize-the-day zeal or at least “okay, let’s go along” opportunism 
of their colleagues.30 
There are many explanations for flexible adjustment in times of 
crisis. I do not discount the element of fear, although Kreyssig and 
Maury teach us that lawyers and judges—members of a powerful insti-
tution not easily crushed by even an Adolf Hitler—can articulate fine 
traditions without being punished. Nor do I under-estimate anti-
Semitism itself, although that factor is exaggerated and falls apart in 
France because there were several doctrinal areas in which judicial re-
sults were pervasively pro-Jewish.31 A highly relevant and still under-
examined factor behind the majoritarian impulse to flexible distortion of 
received texts, traditions, and norms, is that some pervasive doctrine 
seems to support departures from received habits of thought. This doc-
trine does not have to be legal; it can be moral in nature. Thus I have 
written about an exchange between Vichy and the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1941, which seemed to lend Rome’s approbation to Vichy’s 
racial policies while at the same time affirming strongly the Church’s 
complete antipathy to racism. During this exchange, briefly reported in 
note 32 here, the Church apparently made hermeneutic flexibility ex-
plicit and normative. This seems to have comforted the Vichy head of 
state and perhaps also some lawyers and judges professionally tasked 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Kreyssig was unique, but there were as late as the 1942 incident reported above other 
members of the judiciary who were capable of expressing opposition not so much to genocidal 
policy as to Hitler’s direct incursions on judicial authority. See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 21, at 
238–40. 
 31 See WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 241–85 (on landlord-tenant suspected of being Jews); id. 
(on out-of-wedlock children suspected of being Jews). 
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with implementing anti-Semitic laws.32 Some of my ongoing work will 
engage the whole idea of sourcing flexible interpretive strategies to the 
early Christian readings of the Hebrew Bible.33 
 
 32 In a letter, from Leon Berard, a lawyer and Vichy’s emissary to the Roman Catholic 
Church, to his head of state, Berard apparently consoled Petain about his regime’s aberrational 
racist laws:  
2 September 1941. M. le Maréchal: By your letter of 7 August 1941, you honored me 
by requesting information touching questions and problems that might be raised, from 
the Roman Catholic perspective, by the measures your government has taken regarding 
the Jews. I have had the honor of sending you a preliminary response where I observed 
that nothing has ever been said to me at the Vatican that would imply, on the part of 
the Holy See, a critique or disapproval of those legislative and regulatory acts. . . .  
. . . . 
[Nonetheless], one must admit, there is a contradiction between French law and 
Church doctrine[, which is explicitly opposed to racism].  
E. Practical Result of the Contradiction. Conclusion. I just mentioned the sole 
point at which the law of 2 June 1941 contradicts a principle held by the Roman 
Church. But it does not follow from this doctrinal divergence that the French state is 
threatened with . . . even a censure or disapproval that the Holy See might express in 
one form or another about the Jewish laws. . . . As an authorized person at the Vatican 
told me, they mean no quarrel with the Jewish laws. . .  
. . . . 
. . . [There is] an essential distinction that the Church has never ceased to admit and to 
practice, for it is full of wisdom and reason: the distinction between thesis and hypoth-
esis, the thesis in which the principle is invariably affirmed and maintained and the hy-
pothesis, where practical arrangements are organized. 
Id. at 421–22 (third and fourth omissions in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33 For a groundbreaking work in this area, see HAROLD BLOOM, JESUS AND YAHWEH: THE 
NAMES DIVINE (2005), and an earlier masterpiece to which Bloom is often responsive, FRANK 
KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY (1979). Both writers engage with early Christian exegeses, 
for example, of the Hebrew prophetic text of Isaiah: Bloom calls John “a strong misreader” of 
that and other Hebrew texts, BLOOM, supra, at 76, and sees the long-received Hebrew scholars’ 
way of understanding their own texts as “captive” to the eventual Christian triumph over received 
Jewish habits of interpretation, id. at 51. He hints that the long history of this “textual slavery” is 
not necessarily definitive: “Yahweh may not yet have spoken his final word upon this matter.” Id. 
at 37. I am working through the notion of flexiphobia as a way of describing a continuing re-
sistance to the triumphalism of some Christian readings of the Hebrew Bible. I start from the 
proposition that the ultimate “emergency”—the expected end of days—coupled with some real 
skepticism toward strict law, led such writers as Paul and later John to distort the sacred Hebrew 
texts on which they relied and ultimately—when (flexiphobically) nothing came to pass that those 
texts prophesied about the Messiah, including the end of days—flexible distortion of texts became 
a kind of fighting faith. As Nietzsche the careful philologist observed, retaining a sacred text 
while fundamentally altering its meanings took some work. In a remarkably flexiphobic passage 
about interpretive distortion, Nietzsche put it this way: 
However much the Jewish scholars protested, everywhere in the Old Testament there 
were supposed to be references to Christ and only to Christ, and particularly to his 
cross. Wherever any piece of wood, a switch, a ladder, a twig, a tree, a willow, or a 
staff is mentioned, this was supposed to indicate a prophecy of the wood of the cross; 
even the erection of the one-horned beast and the brazen serpent, even Mosses spread-
ing his arms in prayer, even the spits on which the Passover lamb was roasted—all are 
allusions to the cross and as it were preludes to it! Has anyone who asserted this ever 
believed it? . . . [But] they were conducting a war and paid more heed to their oppo-
nents than to the need to stay honest.  
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III.     FLEXIPHOBIA AND INTERNECINE STRIFE: THE DREYFUS CASE AND A 
FOOTNOTE (#50) ON RECENT AMERICAN STRUGGLES WITHIN LIKE-
MINDED LEGAL GROUPS 
 
This Article has asked us to consider reversing our valuation of 
certain words and to experiment with a 180-degree shift from the privi-
leging of “flexibility,” “open-ness,” or “permeability” toward their op-
posite numbers: “inflexibility,” “intractability,” and “stubborn-ness.” In 
this final section, similarly based on an important historical dilemma 
faced by lawyers, I add that even brothers and sisters in arms often de-
velop through a crisis by breaking into the opposed camps of flexibility 
and flexiphobia. To do this, I briefly reference the guidance of recent 
historians of the Dreyfus case34, who have complicated prior received 
oppositions of the “Affair” such as “Dreyfusard/anti-Dreyfusard,” “Re-
publican/Military,” and “Individual/State.” Instead, the key dialectic 
turns out to be flexible vs. intractable within both camps: how strongly 
did key players on each side insist on their positions versus how malle-
able were others who seemed to be taking similar positions on Drey-
fus’s guilt or innocence, on allegiance to Republican values versus those 
of the Army, on the demands of the individual or the state, etc. I argue 
that—with hindsight that extends across the history of twentieth century 
France at least through Vichy—the “best” players on both sides were 
the intractable and the inflexible, and the least effective and ultimately 
the most harmful in hindsight, were the flexible, the malleable, the most 
open to nuanced shifts in position. The re-valuation—inflexible, often 
good vs. flexible, usually bad—permits us to imagine a challenge to our 
customary endorsement of permeable perspectives.35 
The Dreyfus Affair entailed a twelve-year struggle to redeem the 
innocence of a wrongly accused French soldier, Alfred Dreyfus. Con-
victed of treason for turning over military data to the Germans, he was 
then humiliated by the formal stripping of his rank and the ceremonial 
breaking of his sword. Captain Dreyfus was sent to Devil’s Island, 
where he languished in complete isolation for four years. Meanwhile, 
his supporters in France gradually took up his case, realizing that the 
conviction was based on weak evidence, that the judges acted with im-
 
1 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE DAWN OF DAY, aphorism 84 (1881), as quoted in WEISBERG, 
supra note 3, at 428–29. 
 34 See, e.g., JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS (Jeffrey 
Mehlman trans., George Braziller, Inc. ed., 1986); VINCENT DUCLERT, L’AFFAIRE DREYFUS 
(1994); RUTH HARRIS, DREYFUS: POLITICS, EMOTION, AND THE SCANDAL OF THE CENTURY 
(2010). 
 35 This is a brief section of a paper first given in Paris at the Senate Building on July 7, 2011. 
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proper secrecy, and that another identifiable man was in fact the guilty 
party. These “Dreyfusards” agitated for the convicted man’s return to 
France to face a new military trial in the town of Rennes, where he, 
however, was again convicted. The uproar at that stage of the Affair led 
to an offer of a pardon, a key moment in testing the flexiphobic mettle 
of Dreyfus’s supporters, coupled with a grant of amnesty to many anti-
Dreyfusards, who otherwise were facing investigation and trial for falsi-
fying documents, lying under oath and many other transgressions that 
produced and sustained Dreyfus’s unjust punishment. 
Many lawyers, as well as politicians, Protestant religious thinkers, 
and writers such as Emile Zola had lined up passionately on the side of 
the innocent man. Others, supporters of the Army, anti-Republicans, 
and overt anti-Semites, lined up just as intractably against Dreyfus. 
However, as strategic and substantive decisions needed to be made sev-
eral years into the Affair, sub-groups developed that placed at logger-
heads even former allies within the opposed groups. For the Drey-
fusards, lawyers who were flexible compromised key opportunities to 
attack those who remained incurably anti-Dreyfusard and often added to 
Dreyfus’s suffering. Dreyfus may well have lost at his second trial be-
cause the more open and amiable strategies of the defense lawyer Edgar 
Demange prevailed over the hardheaded inflexibility of fellow litigator 
Fernand Labori. The intractable Labori, self-described as “excessively 
devoted to the idea of justice” in his post-trial letter to Dreyfus’s broth-
er,36 lost ground to his far more flexible colleague Demange, whose 
closing argument before the Rennes tribunal displayed altogether too 
much tolerance for the government’s witnesses and basic positions. 
Demange was a classic flexiphile. 
Meanwhile such non-lawyers as the Protestant teacher Abbe Pe-
caud displayed a consistently intolerant attitude toward the strategies of 
his flexible fellow Dreyfusards, particularly regarding the pardon and 
the amnesty. As reported in a fine recent article on the Affair by Serge 
Audier,37 Pecaud would have none of the perfectly reasonable sounding 
approach of a belated Dreyfusard, Leon Bourgeois, who counseled 
compromise: 
In your position and that of other republican leaders in this Dreyfus 
Affair, there is a fundamental moral error: You have sacrificed the 
individual to the community. You have clouded over and diminished 
the face of the individual and thus also the Law.38 
 
 36 BREDIN, supra note 34, at 446. 
 37 Serge Audier, La République, l’affaire Dreyfus et la Raison d’état, 130 REVUE DE SYN-
THESE 289–322 (2009) (Fr.). 
 38 Id. at 295. 
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The Pecaud who would chastise the Dreyfusard leader Joseph 
Reinach in a letter after the second judicial defeat, who would say that 
the Rennes outcome was predictable, blamed to some extent his more 
flexible Dreyfusard colleagues, who in the face of later developments 
displayed a predilection for pardon and amnesty because they feared 
strict law and judicial process.39 Pecaud stood out as perhaps the most 
flexiphobic of the Dreyfusards, especially since, as Audier well shows, 
there was so much late in the game blurring elsewhere of their divisions 
even against the anti-Dreyfusard camp.40 At these final moments in the 
Affair, even for some Dreyfusards, support for the individual by no 
means entailed a rejection of the State or the Army; while for certain 
flexible anti-Dreyfusards, the idea of the individual remained alive 
throughout the Affair. Nonetheless, like Pecaud on the other side of the 
aisle, the less amiable, and more flexiphobic anti-Dreyfusard’s were 
staunchly suspicious of any show among Dreyfusard’s of patriotism or 
support for the army.41 The diehards on both sides were deeply skeptical 
of the flexible crossings over between the two camps; they perceived, 
probably correctly, that these border crossings into seeming semi-
agreement only papered over lasting intractable differences.42 
Perhaps it was his righteous Protestantism, but in Pecaud inflexible 
habits of thought trumped tactical ambiguities, and the pardon and am-
nesty were intolerable. Pecaud and other flexiphobics found strength in 
facing head on the actual, rather than the rhetorically softened, views of 
their enemies, and he felt too many of his colleagues were being tricked 
by their occasional displays of compromise. 
Pecaut’s righteous attitude, matched by his rhetoric, makes him 
sound like a Protestant Talmudist. I do not use the fraught phrase light-
ly, but one thing we know is that Talmudism, seen (largely without le-
gitimate proof) as a kind of literalist legalism, fares very poorly in most 
of Europe (even Reformation Europe), from St. Paul on and certainly 
from the French anti-Semitic perspective of the late 19th century 
through Vichy. In most enlightened as in most anti-Dreyfusard Catholic 
circles, “talmudism” is not a term of approbation.43 But the problem for 
Jews and often for those supporting them passionately was that it was 
the association of Talmudism with an unattractively stubborn allegiance 
to law and ethics that prevailed, certainly during the Affair and Vichy. 
 
 39 See the flexible Dreyfusard senator Scheurer-Kestner’s remark during the Affair’s late 
stages about “dubious tribunals, for juries are always dubious,” BREDIN, supra note 34, at 252, 
435–37. Eventually, Dreyfus received full judicial exoneration, but this took until 1906, a full 
twelve years after his arrest. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 34, at 368. 
 40 Audier, supra note 37, at 300ff. 
 41 HARRIS, supra note 34, at 150. 
 42 Id. at 293–97. 
 43 Id. at 173–74. See the many Vichy doctrinal justifications for anti-Jewish laws as a re-
sponse to stubborn Jewish allegiance to the Talmud, WEISBERG, supra note 3, chs. 2, 10. 
Weisberg.33-5.doc (Do Not Delete) 7/31/2012  9:04 PM 
2112 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 33:5 
Indeed, the distaste of so many French for Dreyfus himself, and to some 
extent for the religion to which he adhered, derived largely from their 
perception of a kind of Jewish inflexibility, an insistence on sticking to a 
position against all odds, a kind of legalism that understands law very 
differently from the way the Republic sees it. “Talmudism,” as a pejora-
tive signifying an inflexible code foreign to French law links Leon 
Blum as Dreyfusard to the Leon Blum placed on trial by Vichy’s second 
justice minister, the pre-war liberal Joseph Barthelemy, at Riom.44 
There was something vaguely “unFrench” about it—too little French 
soil in the sandals, as some said of Blum in the 1930s. 
Immensely to his credit, Pecaut applied inflexibly to the Dreyfus 
case an agenda intractably in line with his commitment to “a lay vision 
of moral improvement based on ‘liberty, solidarity, human dignity, sin-
cerity, uprightness, justice, respect for the rights and duties of the moral 
life.’”45 Pecaud’s enduringly inflexible allies displayed such characteris-
tics as Colonel Picquart’s “persistence” and his insistence on “moral 
reparation”46 rather than a pardon or amnesty; as the lawyer Labori’s 
self-described “excessively devoted to the idea of justice,”47 as Georges 
Clemenceau’s “austere moral high mindedness,” which always bothered 
the more pragmatic in the Dreyfusard camp,48 and as the neo-Kantian 
categorical imperative sometimes adopted by Jean Jaures and Emile 
Durkheim.49 These deontological positions exhibit an almost stiff-
necked aversion to what Duclert’s fine chapter (thirteen) calls everyone 
else’s “manipulation of justice.” But many other allies began, under the 
influence of new developments and increased pressures, to split from 
their intractable colleagues. Flexiphobia, in other words, is also subject 
to flexible variation.50 
 
 44 See WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 6–36. 
 45 HARRIS, supra note 34, at 197 (citing Phyllis Stock-Morton). 
 46 BREDIN, supra note 34, at 440. 
 47 Id. at 445. 
 48 Id. at 435. 
 49 Id. at 445; HARRIS, supra note 34, at 339. 
 50 On the legal team to which I belonged in a successful Holocaust-related federal court 
action, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the settlement phase 
brought on a palpable dissolution of perspective among us. This reflects the fraying at the edges 
of even principled groupings of lawyers as stress builds and new elements are added. For ac-
counts of the Vichy related restitution process and the plaintiffs’ lawyers, see STUART EIZEN-
STAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF 
WORLD WAR II, 324–25 (2003), and MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE 
FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 196–99 (2003). A very recent evocation of Dreyfus-
like internecine strife relates to the targeted assassination of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki. 
See, e.g., David Cole, Killing Citizens in Secret, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 9, 2011, http://www.
nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/09/killing-citizens-secret. Identifying and then making a 
hierarchy out of the multiplicity of issues involved, as we saw in Vichy/Guernsey law, are key 
variables when contentious issues divide like-minded actors. Many post-9/11 legal questions have 
occupied dozens of (mostly) legal scholars who formed an online e-list at virtually the onset of 
the “emergency.” I am one of the participants. 
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I have argued that the opposition flexible/inflexible stands as a 
marker not only for historical legal crises but also for later—indeed 
current—events. Flexiphobic moral fervor is often linked, as we have 
seen, to an idea of law as the best ultimate barometer of truth and the 
best pathway – if faithfully followed – to right actions and policies. But 
distortions of law through overly flexible interpretive strategies, or even 
outright skepticism about law’s place in the realm of decisive action, 
have prevailed in the arenas this Article has foregrounded. Flexiphobia 
must be more empathetically taught and fashioned into a more habitual 
state of mind than its currently successful rival, which displays con-
stantly its infinite malleability. 
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 You are a lawyer on the occupied (British) channel island of 
Guernsey in early 1944. You have a prewar law degree from the Uni-
versity of Kent (Canterbury) and an LL.M. from Georgetown Law 
School and have a thriving practice on Guernsey since 1936. You have 
been asked by the Bailiff of Guernsey (who has been delegated full ad-
ministrative power by the occupying powers for this matter) to com-
mence proceedings against a Mrs. V.B. Woolnaugh of Vauvert Manor, 
Vauvert Road, to prohibit her from owning and operating a small inn on 
Vauvert Road. She has been the proprietress of that inn for some twen-
ty-five years. 
 “Distasteful business,” mumbled the Bailiff as he handed you the 
attached file. “But she lied to us on December 2, 1940 [see infra p. 
2128]. Apparently she was secretly married to this fellow Auguste Spitz 
the month before, you know, the one who got deported last year. And 
the ceremony, we’re told by this fellow Gill, took place in a Jewish 
temple!” 
 “Sorry about the print quality of this file,” The Bailiff continues, 
“but it’s all in there.” 
 As a preliminary measure, the Bailiff asks you to draft a memo 
stating the issues arising under the law of April 26, 1941 that might 
apply to this situation.51 He attaches the recent law review article by a 
certain Joseph Haennig, a French lawyer.52 “My good friend, the Gau-
leiter of Paris, tells me that lawyers discuss this stuff a lot over there. 
It’s basically the same regime, and the law’s no different.” 
 Respond to this situation in four pages or less. 
 
 
 51 For relevant statutory sections, see infra p. 2115. 
 52 See infra pp. 2130–31 for a reproduction of the article. 
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Any person having at least three grandparents of pure Jewish blood 
shall be deemed to be a Jew. A Jewish grandparent having belonged to 
the Jewish religion shall be deemed to be of pure Jewish blood. 
 
Any person having two Jewish grandparents of pure Jewish blood who 
(a) at the time of the publication of this Order, belongs to the Jewish 
religious community or who subsequently joins it; or (b) at the time of 
the publication of this Order is married to a Jew shall be deemed a Jew. 
 
In doubtful cases, any person who belongs or has belonged to this Jew-
ish religious community shall be deemed a Jew. 
 
 
Prohibition of Certain Economic Activities.54 
 
(1) On or after May 20, 1941, Jews and Jewish undertakings for whom 
or for which a managing administrator has not been appointed shall be 
prohibited from carrying on the following economic activities: (a) 
wholesale or retail trade; (b) hotel and catering industry; (c) restaurants; 
[(d)–(s) not added here] . . . . 
 
(2) In no undertaking shall a Jew be engaged as a higher official or as an 
employee who enters into contact with customers. Persons who . . . have 
right or signature or . . . who individually are designated as such by the 
Militaerbefehlshaber or the competent French authorities [!] shall be 
deemed to be higher officials. 
 
 53 See infra p. 2116 for the original text. 
 54 See infra p. 2117 for the original text. 
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The text of this letter reads as follows: “Sir, In accordance with the or-
der relating to Jews in [the] Guernsey Evening Press of November 28th, 
1940, I herewith attach [a] list of my securities. I would mention that 
my mother (now deceased) was a Jewess, but my father is a Gentile and 
I was baptized in the faith of the  Church of England a few months after 
my birth at Holy Trinity Church [rest of line illegible] and further I mar-
ried a Gentile. I am, Sir, Faithfully Yours, Violet [Blanche?] 
Woolnaugh.”55 
 
 55 See also infra p. 2134. 
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APPENDIX B: GUERNSEY SCENARIO, SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 
 
I. NARRATOR. In late June 1940, the Nazis seized the British Chan-
nel Islands. These territories, including the Islands of Jersey, Sark, and 
Guernsey among others, became the longest occupied lands in all of 
Hitler’s Europe. Even the D-Day troops bound for Normandy were not 
instructed to liberate them. By the end of the War, it was reported that 
there were 230 offspring of German soldiers on Guernsey, and the U.S. 
press also noted that “1000 Jews and Russians may have been murdered 
on the Islands.” Considerably later it was learned that Jews such as Au-
guste Spitz, who plays a small role in our drama tonight, had been de-
ported from the Islands by order of Law. On Guernsey, the scene of our 
drama, these unfortunates were defined as Jews under the law of April 
26, 1941, one of the only English-language laws of this kind in all of 
Hitler’s Europe and modeled after Vichy racial law. [LAW PRO-
JECTED ONTO SCREEN] The time is late in 1943. Much of the ad-
ministrative work on the Island was done by British officials such as the 
Bailiff, whom you will meet later. Now to our drama: 
 
II. Two ordinary Islanders, Mary Bull (“M”), carrying a basket 
with new potatoes, and Jenna Stalwart (“J”), carrying a newspaper. 
LOCATION SIGN SAYS “DOWNTOWN GUERNSEY” 
M. Hello, J. How are you today? Is anything new? 
J. Cabbage soup and potatoes yesterday, potato soup and cabbages to-
day. I’m constipated, and we’re still occupied. 
M. Tell me news, not history. What’s that you’re carrying, the “Guern-
sey Evening Press”? That’s German news in English. 
J. A lot of the news is about cigarettes and rationing of food—same 
damned stuff. And most of the regulations they print seem to come 
more from Vichy France than either Berlin or our own administrators. 
M. I heard our Bailiff and his staff were very keen on surveying every-
body as to their ancestry. There are even questionnaires. And if you’re 
thought to be Jewish, you can only shop between 3 and 4 in the after-
noon. 
J. There’s less and less about Jews going ‘round these days. 
M. Not surprising. That situation is being taken care of. Some order for 
a change. 
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J. Who would have thought there were so many on Guernsey? I didn’t 
know any, apart from Mr. Cohen. But he was Church of England. So 
was his father. 
M. But if his grand-parents are Jewish—or at least three of them, any-
ways—that makes him Jewish. 
J. How do you know that? 
M. I think I read it in the very paper you’re reading. I also heard that all 
non-Islanders —I mean not born here—are being sent to work in Ger-
many. 
J. For what crime? That’s not British justice. 
M. We’re no longer in Britain. We’re part of the “new Europe”. 
J. More like a European prison, where we’re left to starve. 
M. Sssshhh. Be quiet. The walls have ears. 
J. Only the wind can hear us. 
M. And the new potatoes. 
[End of scene.] 
NARRATOR. Unknown to Mary Bull and Jenna Stalwart, all those 
previously defined as Channel Island Jews had been deported in Febru-
ary, 1943. . . . . Now our scene shifts to real time: November 1943 in a 
Guernsey courtroom. As you will see, this so-called Administrative 
Court does not exercise adjudicatory authority. Its function is to make a 
public record of information for use by the Bailiff of Guernsey. 
 
III. Three judge panel interviewing Mr. Gill and Mrs. Woolnaugh; 
LOCATION SIGN SAYS “ADMINISTRATIVE COURT” 
Judge A (seated in the middle). This Court has been directed to in-
quire into and make a public record of information concerning the status 
of Mrs. Violet Woolnaugh and her ownership of an Inn at Vauvert Road 
in Guernsey pursuant to the law of April 26, 1941 as published in the 
Gazette Officielle. At the conclusion of this brief factual hearing, the 
Court will turn this distasteful matter over to the Bailiff of Guernsey for 
such disposition as she deems appropriate. 
Judge A. The Court calls Mrs. Violet Woolnaugh. [PAUSE FOR HER 
TO APPEAR] Mrs. Woolnaugh, do you own the Bed & Breakfast on 
Vauvert Road? 
Mrs. W. Yes. I have owned and managed it for 25 years. 
Judge A. Do you have a statement at this time? 
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Mrs. W. Yes, your honor. I would simply repeat my written statement 
of 28 Nov., 1940 to the Bailiff: [READING HER STATEMENT] “In 
accordance with the order relating to Jews in the Guernsey Evening 
Press, I herewith attach a list of my securities. I would mention that my 
mother (now deceased) was a Jewess, but my father is a Gentile and I 
was baptized in the faith of the Church of England, a few months after 
my birth, at Holy Trinity Church and further I married a Gentile.” 
Judge A. Thank you Mrs. Woolnaugh. You are free to leave the Court. 
Judge B. The Court calls Mr. S.W. Gill to make his statement. 
Gill. I am the owner of a business on High Street in Guernsey. I am 
aware of the provisions of the Guernsey law relating to the Jews of 
April 26, 1941, and I was aware of the prior version of that law dating 
to early September, 1940. 
Judge B. Mr. Gill, I show you a letter to the Inspector of Police dated 26 
October 1940 that bears your signature on your business letterhead and 
ask that you read it aloud. 
Gill. READING FROM STATEMENT “I am not, neither is any mem-
ber of the staff employed at this address, of the Jewish religion. I have 
never had access to the list of shareholders, so I am not in a position to 
say whether the shares owned by Jews comprise more than 50% or not. 
As far as I know, the firm is English and a public company of which 
this is only a branch, and the shares are widely held by the British pub-
lic.” 
Judge B. And you prepared and sent this letter pursuant to an 
official request? 
Gill. Yes, and permit me to state on the record that I was hap-
py to do my bit to cooperate with the authorities. 
Judge B. Mr. Gill, do you have information relating to a Mrs. Violet 
Woolnaugh, who also maintains an enterprise here on Guernsey? 
Gill. I do. She was secretly married in a temple to August Spitz soon 
after I wrote my letter. 
Judge B. The court takes judicial notice that Mr. August Spitz, born 25 
August 1901, was deported last year. 
Judge B: Thank you, Mr. Gill. You are free to leave the court. 
Judge C. At this time, this Court is adjourned. 
 
IV. The Bailiff (“B”) and the Head of the Guernsey Bar (“GL”). 
LOCATION SIGN SAYS “BAILIFF’S OFFICE” 
GL knocks 
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GL: Hello, Bailiff. 
B: Distasteful business. The court has turned over to me the disposition 
of Mrs. Woolnaugh’s ownership and management of her Bed and 
Breakfast on Vauvert Road. Your private practice has brought you over 
to France, and you’re the only soul on this Island who knows anything 
about these racial laws and the way they work. The Court heard testi-
mony. . ..You’ve got to help me. 
GL. Well, I’ve never done anything in this area. 
B. We’ll pay you well. As Head of the Guernsey Bar, you’re well liked 
here, and well educated – what with your fancy degrees from Kent and 
even from the Yanks! 
GL. I’m still not sure. My practice is going well anyway. And I usually 
have my guests stay at Mrs. W’s B& B. I’ve got one there now, a law-
yer from Paris. 
B. Well, be that as it may, we need to deal with this, and maybe he can 
help. Interpretation of racial laws is influenced by Vichy readings. 
GL. Perhaps. My guest has done some work in that area.56 
B. All the better. Mrs. W seems to have lied to us about her marital sta-
tus. What we surmise based on her own statements puts her at risk of 
being Jewish, and non-Aryans can’t deal with the public in enterprises 
such as Vauvert Road. If she married a Jew, as this fellow Gill says – 
GL. Married a Jew? Her name is Mrs. Woolnaugh. . . . 
B. Mr. Woolnaugh is in England if anywhere – blasted war – and Gill 
saw her marrying Spitz in a temple. 
GL. Spitz? 
B. You may not know him. Anyway, he’s been deported. . . . 
[end of scene] 
 
V. GL and Joseph Haennig (“H’) LOCATION SIGN SAYS “MRS. 
W’S INN” 
GL. So that’s the story, Joseph. What should I do? 
H. Did you speak to her – she’s right downstairs preparing my eggs and 
bacon. 
GL. I’m not going to, and please don’t say anything to her about this. 
She was allowed to leave the courthouse the other day before this fellow 
 
 56 S ee supra p. 2130. 
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Gill testified against her. She probably knows nothing about any inquiry 
against her. 
H. Well, for what it’s worth. Vichy lawyers and judges are in a quanda-
ry about what to do with people like her. 
GL. Like her? 
H. Yes, people who seem to have two Jewish and two non-Jewish 
grandparents. They are in a grey area under the statutes. In fact, I just 
published an article in a Paris law review. For mixed heritage folks like 
Mrs. W seems to be, folks with two Jewish and two non-Jewish grand-
parents, French courts are all over the map. I’m glad I’m not in your 
shoes. For what it’s worth, my article cites a Nazi court in Leipzig that 
let a girl go who had mixed grandparental heritage even though she 
listed herself in a synagogue as a Jew to try to get any kind of work still 
permitted from Jewish businesses. 
GL. Let her go. Amazing. Was she married, though? 
H. No. There’s a lot more I can tell you, but you should just read 
my article. Here comes Mrs. W 
NARRATOR: Mr. Haennig’s article was sent to you earlier this month. 
 
VI. The Head of the Guernsey Bar and the Bailiff. LOCATION 
SIGN SAYS “BAILIFF’S OFFICE.” 
GL. I read Haennig’s article. Fascinating. But it’s very complicated. He 
says some Vichy courts let mixed heritage suspects offer evidence not 
only of being baptized but anything else that might take them out of the 
category Jew. Bailiff, I think we will need to enlist all the members of 
the Guernsey Bar to analyze this issue. They know better than to decline 
such an assignment. 
B. You are right. I will commission the bar members. . 
 
VII. The Bailiff’s Instructions  
B. (Putting on wig and addressing the audience)Upon consultation 
with the Head of the Guernsey Bar, I hereby direct that all Guernsey 
lawyers in attendance this evening assist me in addressing the problem 
of Mrs. Woolnaugh’s status under the Law of April 26, 1941. At his 
suggestion, I have further designated some of our most distinguished 
members of the Bar to serve as Team Leaders. I direct you to look at the 
colored sticker on your program to determine your team. I am now go-
ing to introduce each team leader. When I am through with the intro-
ductions, I direct each of you to join your team leader immediately and 
follow your team leader to the room where you will deliberate. You are 
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to report back to this room immediately upon the conclusion of your 
deliberations. Here are the team leaders and the meeting rooms: 
Team 1 (Red):  Tribeca front 
Team 2 (Orange):  
Team 3 (Black):  
Team 4 (Green): NY (25th floor) 
Team 5 (Blue): Chicago (25th floor) 
Team 6 (Purple): Gramercy 
